For Salim-our dear family companion who, lying before me, tells me through his breathing, slow movements, and how he folds himself that he is readying to leave us. 
Introduction
In "Designs Along a Length of String," Tim Ingold generously invites his audience into his thoughts on lines and meshworks. 2 In a lecture theater crisscrossed with a "mesh" of string-real string!-we are literally and figuratively asked to feel how lines feel. Through Ingold's eyes, his pacing, touching, writing, and wording, and through the string around us, we see how lines thread, join, loop, knot, turn back on themselves, and hang loose and open…, offering the space for more, much more.
For me, Ingold's talk of flourishing lines and emergent relations speaks to his longstanding ideas on "the processional." With his lines and their processional becomings, he is giving us the space to think, a "tool for thinking," as philosopher Isabelle Stengers uses the phrase. 3 In this article, I want to think with Ingold's ideas and try to work with them in just this fashion, as a tool. To begin, I draw out some of the key concepts that Ingold introduced in his closing plenary at Research Through Design (RTD) in 2015 and weave these concepts into the ideas he has developed in his writings. I then thread a new line of questions into this thinking by drawing in Vinciane Despret's beautiful accounts of animal-human relations. For many, this might seem an unexpected turn, but my intention is to use the coupling of works from Ingold and Despret to complicate how design researchers and practitioners think and work through design. By turning our attention to what Ingold refers to as the sympathy that we build up with things and, at the same time, to how these active attunements, as Despret calls them, afford the conditions for "new existences,"
4 I want to suggest that design is much more than a mere augmenting of human ability. What especially interests me are the conditions made possible through-design and the more-than-human capacities that are given a chance in the lively relations between humans and nonhumans. Thus, in this knotting together of ideas, what I am keen to do is engage in a widening of research through design-that is, to offer a different way of engaging with the conference series' short history and put forward a generative alternative that might be enacted through design.
Lines
The line is Ingold's magnum opus; his own thread of stories of walking, cutting, drawing, sawing, weaving, and dwelling draw us back to the ways in which lines are processionally brought into the world-how what comes before and what is to follow gives form to a present movement. 5 The line is Ingold's answer to the network, with its "timeless, motionless, inert" assemblages of nodes and connections. For Ingold, the assemblage "will not help… It is too static, and it fails to answer the question of how the entities of which it is composed actually fasten to each other." Yet the line, he contrasts, "allows us to bring the social back to life. In the life of lines, parts are not components; they are movements." 6 The line is then in motion, never static, always leading to something or somewhere else. This is, provocatively, a "world without objects." The meshwork is a corollary to the line, for there are many lines that thread through and between the lives of humans and nonhumans. Here, we don't have to limit ourselves to "blobs," as Ingold calls them, but lines, loops, and knots that thread together the lively connections. Again, we are directed away from the static, lifeless point-the thing-and led to see the always becoming, the "goings-on." As Ingold puts it, "[t]he thing about things… is that they occur-that is, they carry on along their lines." 8 For precisely this reason, Ingold draws our attention to the generative and emergent qualities of lines, and their twists and knottings in meshworks.
The meshwork of lines also puts relations center stage. Ingold's fascination is with the ways our own lines crisscross with sentient and less than sentient others and with how the lines that surround us afford a becoming in the world. Here, we find the back and forth of sawing a plank is shaped by the cut before, and the one to come, but so too by the wood with its grain, and the weight of hands and bodies. All work together. Not only does the maker cut into the plank; the making also exerts a force back on the maker. 9 Ingold extends this conceptualization further with his growing-in-making or anthropogenesis, where the making is wound together with the being, and where what we are and what we become is actively threaded into the practices of making. In knitting, "the shape of the clothing might map onto the bodily form of the wearer," but the shape of the garment and the way the body is held to wear it "arises from countless micro-gestures of threading and looping that turn a continuous thread of yarn into a surface." 10 Ingold's concepts and images, then, give us a distinctive way to talk about how to approach design; how, piece by piece, iteratively, and along a continuous line, transformations are made and remade. The ways that we cut, draw, sketch, stitch, mold, and weave are movements-made in and along a line of string-that knot, shift and flow into others. We might say, as Ingold does, that design is forever in an unfolding "attunement" and that all manner of things are in continual emergence through a rhythm of relations:
The task of the builder is… to bring one way of life and growth (of the tree in the forest) to a close in preparation for the launching of another (of the craft in the ocean).
11
In Ingold's lines we might see a similar thread to Donald Schön's reflective practice 12 -though perhaps one that is more grounded in the material experience. Ingold sheds light on how we string ourselves together with others in practice and use such material enactments to reflect-in-action-to move, shift, and adjust, as we saw through the plank of wood. Similarly, Ingold speaks to the mesh of interconnecting lines, or conversations as Manzini refers to them, through which design emerges: "the tangle of conversations occurring during design activities… and the conversations that take place in various design arenas" (emphasis in original).
13 Yet Ingold 15 And correspondence, for Ingold, is about much more than the subject and object, than human agency and its mastery over the thing; instead, correspondence accounts for active trajectories and transformations that occur between human and nonhuman lives. 16 This, I suggest, offers us an expansive view of design, where "things are continually coming into being through processes of growth and movement."
17 This view not only places design in an exploratory mode, 18 but also poses a lot of hard questions to those who want to draw tidy lines between ourselves as autonomous actors and the tools used to design, and indeed what is produced through design. Thus, in surfacing the many connections and distributions of human agencies, we are forced to ask what we mean when we talk about a design that is human-centered and that places the human as part of but still somehow separate from material practice. Ingold tells us that making, in its broadest sense, can't be simply bracketed off from being, and neither can being be separated from making. We are in an unending thread of becoming as we make: "Humans are not just the producers of objects to consume. They too are transformed in the process; what they achieve is achieved in them."
19
In the remainder of this article, I use this as an inflection point, asking what it means to design and research through design. What effects and affects are we seeking to enliven? In what ways are we hoping to make an impression in worlds? And ultimately, what relations do we hope to afford between ourselves and the things we are aspiring to live with and through? Taking Ingold's invitation to heart, I make the case that it no longer seems good enough to see the things we design as tools or instruments that merely augment our capacities. These "tools" or "instruments" do not merely offer, in a very limited sense, materials that overcome our intrinsic human limits, so that we might see, hear, reach, grasp, draw, and make better. Again, we find in Ingold an attunement with the world of things, where we emerge as "more-thanhuman" through our unfolding relations. 20 Unbounded through our relations and rapport with things, we are enabled to do and be so much more than autonomous actors; we extend ourselves through mutual forces (impressions and sensations)-the twists and knots binding lines of string give form to and shape movement.
Other Beings Yet, I develop my thinking not with Ingold's lines alone, but with the introduction of what might seem an unusual and admittedly peculiar companion-namely, a view into ethology, and specifically the view of Vinciane Despret and her profoundly uplifting and intellectually arousing examination of the lives we humans share with other living animals. This move, as I've said, may seem a peculiar disjuncture, but my guess is that Ingold might appreciate the connection. In the quote that opens this article, Ingold is in the midst of reminding his audience that, in a contemporary philosophy obsessed with the relations between humans and nonhumans, we find a peculiar lack of interest in animals. In his RTD 2015 talk, we might hear an invitation to speculate on such matters. 21 What's more, Despret, I feel, responds with a reasonable rapprochement to Ingold's worries about the term "assemblage." Referring to the frequent translation of Gilles Deleuze's agencement to "assemblage," she writes:
I would rather opt for keeping the French word: agencement. First, this term renders perceptible the intimate link between "agencement" and "agency," and second, it insists upon an active process of attunement that is never fixed once and for all. An agencement is a rapport of forces that makes some beings capable of making other beings capable, in a plurivocal manner, in such a way that the agencement resists being dismembered, resists clearcut distribution. Despret's unique reading of animals and their manifold relations seems to me to equip us with a way to further work through the kind of thinking that Ingold invites. To be specific, what matters here-that is deeply relevant for design and the particular thread of thinking we are following-is Despret's vividly expressed open-mindedness to an expansion of agential capabilities. 23 By paying close attention to Despret's work (and the many scholars she recognizes in her writings), we find not only much in common with Ingold's ideas of the processional, but a catalogue of detailed examples of how mutual relations can be thought of as extending or expanding capability. In celebrating her achievements, Buchanan, Chrulew, and Busso write of Despret's work as "the practical study of what humans or animals can do." Her view onto multispecies relations, they explain, is "not of what they are, of their essence, but of what they're capable, of what they're doing, of the powers that are theirs…." 24 In reading her catalogue of stories, it is difficult not to be compelled by Despret's sensitivity to how connections are made and relations unfold to produce something more-than-something only possible through precisely the activities of a woman feeding her sheep, a breeder talking with his cows, or a parrot talking with an ethologist. In more than 20 years of thinking and writing about these matters, Despret has strung together far too many wonderful and generative stories to repeat here. However, I want to touch on just two areas of her work that can help us develop a sense of what her ideas offer.
I turn first to a seemingly straightforward case. Despret has put a good deal of thought into the behavioral experiments to which rats (and other animals) are subjected, and specifically into the use of the manufactured maze as an artifact of experimentation. 25 We know the drill: A rat is deprived of something-for example, food, senses, or body parts-or "provided" with something-drugs, alcohol, or nicotine. She or he is then judged for her or his capacity to learn and navigate a maze (usually to find food). So on its face, the test would seem to be whether the rat has an instinctive capacity for navigation and spatial learning. This test also operates on the premise that everything else can be controlled so that rats only navigate a maze when they are hungry and to obtain food. (Crucially, this biological register forms the basis for claiming that any observable capacity can be generalized to other animals, including humans.) Yet, with Despret's guidance, we immediately run into a question about these sorts of experiments that is never seriously asked, but would appear to be quite fundamental to what is at stake: "How can this experimental arrangement possibly interest an animal?" Or to phrase it slightly differently, as perhaps the animal might, "what could they (the humans) possibly be interested in?" If we think through these experiments and follow what happens "back stage," as Despret does, we find that animals of all kinds (e.g., cats, rats, parrots) often fail to be "conditioned" for the particular purposes of the controlled experiment-put simply, food doesn't seem to be the only imperative, and the wider experimental conditions, no matter how restrictive the controls, confound the efforts to determine general accounts of animal/human behavior. After being deprived of food, cats refuse to eat; subjected to repeated recordings of human speech paired with food rewards, myna birds show disinterest in talking; in carefully controlled environments, rats are better at learning routes if the experimenters think they are intelligent; and so on. However, "off stage," these animals show in a multitude of ways capabilities that exceed the narrow view presented by these (null) results: Cats show a curiosity in the lives of their experimenters; myna birds talk when their experimenters take them home; and rats, among other accomplishments, reportedly run faster when observed by humans. These "results" are never reported because they contravene the motives of the experiment and fail to correctly respond to what the experiment and experimenters have set out to answer:
If an animal responds according to his own habits, in the register of what interests him, the researchers would consider this a kind of "ruse"-he admittedly did what was asked of him, but he did so for the "wrong reasons."
27
Experimental research of this kind does everything in its power to compartmentalize and purify the conditions, but in so doing, it strips the experiments of precisely those things that make the world meaningful. Rats are literally stripped of their senses, mazes are stripped of their discernable features, and experimenters are persuaded to leave the details of the relations with animals "off stage." Sort after is a primitive, innate stimulus-response pair, which might somehow exist outside the meanings and relevances of the animals being examined. What is left bears little to no relationship to the world that the experimenter is hoping to produce some relevant effect. The situation is nothing more than perverse. Despret can't help but see the funny side:
The humor of the situation is too nice not to be underlined: The researchers compartmentalize the research; the animals do not stop prompting them to decompartmentalize it.
28
For Despret, much of the trouble comes down to asking the right questions. And for her, the right questions are not whether animals can be duped into responding this way or that to some stimulus that has little or no relevance to them, but instead whether we can ask questions that give animals the chance to convey their own interests and ways of doing things, and that give them the opportunity to communicate these to us humans.
We might seem to be a long way from the design of things, and from what we might want to do through design, but there is a point here, I feel, that should be important to us. In short, we might understand that a good deal of work done through design compartmentalizes in a similar way. Yes, we grapple with being sensitive to the contexts in which actions and activities occur-and indeed to a wider culture. 29 But we have very few if any tools (or a register) for working with everything, altogether. By viewing things in terms of affordances, human actions, and system outputs, we do not seem all that far from that innate stimulusresponse pair. We reduce things to a sequence of defined stepsa tool's design, input, interaction, output-and neglect the world that is being lived in and how living brings things together so that they have meaning and relevance to us. That is, to determine some general principles about a design, through design, we have diverted our attention away from the very things we do to make the world personally meaningful. We have failed to develop ways to think and talk in terms of the dialogue we build up with the surroundings: with other humans and nonhumans and with the ways these relations unfold over time. 30 And we too easily forget to recognize that our experiences with the artifacts we design cannot be bracketed off or compartmentalized from what is meaningful, and how that meaning is brought, actively, into the world. should interest us, but to begin wondering how we might be open to the possibilities of what could become interesting-of how to develop, twist, and cultivate these possibilities between an artifact and its user. We can then take seriously a design that is open to the question, "How could this possibly be made interesting?"
The second area of Despret's work that I draw on is related to this openness. One of Despret's stories considers sheep and the ways they organize themselves. The "classical" view in ethology, as Despret refers to it, is that sheep are most obviously characterized by their instinctive drive to eat (much like rats). The trouble is, this version of the collective behavior of sheep does nothing to overcome the strikingly superficial understanding we have of them, nor does it account for the vexing questions that arise if a bit more care is put into understanding the lives they live. For example, it fails to consider that the preoccupation with sheep and their food may be because eating is one of the easier things to find sheep doing, or that so much of what we observe sheep doing is dictated by the strict regimes of breeding to which they are subject. Any inventiveness in sheep is quickly selected out of a flock. Small wonder, then, that we know so little about what sheep are interested in, other than grass. Despret writes:
[The sheep] have never been able to testify to what interests them since whatever it is that might interest them has been offered no affordance, no possibility of articulation with what interests those who attest on their behalf.
34
One recurrent trope that has been spun from this impoverished version of sheep life is that of the hierarchy-and specifically the way the competition for food is said to play a central role in determining the organization of sheep. 35 Sheep flocks are repeatedly characterized as led by long-horned, dominant males that fight for control, "corresponding to theories of hierarchy (they obtain the right to push their way around with their horns, the males in front and the females behind)." 36 However, through the work of Thelma Rowell (a primatologist who has turned her attention to sheep), Despret suggests another version of events that is equally plausible and, it must be said, seems to be considerably more attentive to the situations in which sheep find themselves. Challenging what she calls the "scandal" of the hierarchy, Rowell makes the claim that a concern for predators, rather than food alone, is what occupies sheep and dictates their social organization. A possible reason for their seemingly obvious concern for food might be that the human observer is in fact a deterrent for predators. Much of the effort and organization invested in managing predation is mitigated by the presence of human observers (e.g., ethologists) so that observers simply witness the sheep getting on with the business of eating. Perversely, by observing them and reducing their apparent capacities through our limited register, we have, quite possibly, also given them the opportunity to widen their repertoire-allowing them to use the safety that human observers afford to arrange and organize themselves differently.
Further complicating matters, and showing a sophistication not accounted for by the hierarchy model, Rowell shows that the fighting between rams for leadership is largely limited to the one month of mating each year; that fights are highly ritualized and performative, with few signs of all-out battles for a blunt idea of supremacy; that older females often lead flocks outside of mating season; and that relationships other than the usually fleeting fights between males demand study-including the "friendships" between males and the lasting companionships between ewes and their daughters. 37 This string of alternative accounts, offering different versions of sheep's lives, led Rowell to design an inventive kind of device for observing sheep. As Despret recounts, Rowell's devicedevised during a time in which she followed her primatology training and effectively lived among the sheep-was an additional food bowl. She fed her 22 companions from 23 bowls. This device was a strikingly small and simple one and was designed to offer the sheep the chance to display an alternative to the orthodoxy in ethology-to reveal that a hierarchical configuration organized for the purposes of food consumption might not be all that matters to sheep. Just as the human observer might afford a new repertoire, the additional bowl of food was Rowell's invitation to the sheep to reveal something they had not been given the chance to do before: to show themselves to be socially sophisticated.
As an example, this device is relevant to design because it moves us closer to what being open through design might look like. What Despret refers to as versions is helpful here.
38 Like Ingold's lines and their corresponding meshworks, these versions speak to the multiple threads that bring the world into being; Despret's "versions draw a web." 39 Despret uses the idea to suggest not just a plurality of worlds that affect us, but an openness to worlds coexisting, and from this step an openness to the possibility of other worlds, other versions. For Despret, then, they amount to a device that affords hesitation-a chance to ask questions about what might just be possible, how differences might flourish and allow "many more entities to be active." 40 This perspective amounts to an additive empiricism, according to Bruno Latour-one that is "interested in objective facts and grounded claims" but seeks to "complicate, to specify, and, whenever possible, to slow down and, above all, hesitate so as to multiply the voices that can be heard." 41 So, through design, the question of openness is the question of how we might allow other possibilities to emerge, and how these possibilities might be "additive"-how they might be devices that allow for "many more entities" to be active. As Despret herself conveys, this openness stands in stark contrast to the vision, which is so often found in design. The vision implies a position to be taken, some predisposition to one version over others; it is more of a personal opinion. Meanwhile, version speaks to the "plurality and mutual transformability" of worlds. 42 These versions are lines of becoming, lines open to transformations. As both Ingold and Despret suggest, the transformations in our being occur in and through the interminglings. As Ingold asks so astutely: "Is not the workman, too, a being among others, including non-human others, whose mastery only follows what they have granted him…? Are we not always with things before we do anything to them?" 43 Despret's concern for these non-human others offers a stronger sense of what forms the underpinnings of this being "granted" and being "with"; the possibility is given, through new articulations and co-figurings, for things to transgress what is assumed to be their essence, to actively undergo metamorphosis by attunement or "becoming-with." 44 Moreover, Despret's understanding of authorizing adds a further depth to these versions; she invites us to think of "expectations in terms of 'who authorizes,'" from which she suggests that "we can see that everything is shifting, articulating many more things, giving chances to many more entities to belong to the real world." 45 The crux of the matter for Despret seems to turn on trust and faith-of trusting and having faith in worlds that could be more open to different ways of being. In this realm, we might not think of designed artifacts as only affording actions or behaviors. In countering the repertoire of limitations and "redistributing the influence," we might also come to think of them (and the conditions they are used in) as authorizing other possibilities, other versions. How a thing (in particular conditions) can authorize, through design, becomes a strategy to invite more versions, to give more versions a chance: "It allows us to transform a cascade of bad faith into its opposite, into a cascade of new existences raising new questions." 46 
Going-On
To be clear, my suggestion to set the openings in motion and to offer a little bit more faith and trust in things is not simply based on making a superficial case for likening animals, such as rats and sheep, to the artifacts we design. Such a suggestion would be wrong in too many ways! For me, the relevance for design is a deeper and more profound one: It is concerned with animating the relations we have with things in the world (and the relations they have to us) and finding ways to extend the mutual capacities, the mutual becomings. This perspective directs our attention not only toward the product, service, or, indeed, experience we design.
Instead, it urges us to expand the capacities our endlessly unfolding relations have for creating and extending ourselves-with-others. The opportunity arises to understand "through-design" not as a way to sketch out a vector space for research, but to speculate on "becoming-with": becoming with the world, and becoming with the conditions and capabilities design might make possible.
Ingold's invitation to consider design beyond what he calls articulation is a helpful one: "So I'm thinking we should think about design in terms of sympathetic relationships or what I call correspondence rather than in terms of the articulation of elements."
47 Too easily, through design, we can feel the impulse to be responsive to our capacities, seeing them as a set of primitive or primordial needs to be accommodated; this view seems to lead us into the language of articulation or augmentation. We see tools as a way to somehow work with and within our limits, and thus the need to couple, as Ingold refers to them, two "rigid elements." What we find in Despret's stories with animals, as well as Ingold's strings and lines, are lessons for how we might begin to treat the relations-the correspondences-as openings and as opportunities and possibilities for more sympathetic, richer, and more expansive ways of becoming together. We then face the possibility of getting past the limiting language of human-centeredness that cannot do anything but overestimate our mastery and agency in the world. Our entangled lines and lives with animals give us the possibility to dream for new entities and, through design, to begin to give these entities the chance:
If one is designing along a length of string, then it's about hopes and dreams and not about the plans and predictions. It's where the hopes and dreams always exceed, overstep any kinds of ends you might place for them. So designers' longing is something like breaking a trail; it's open-ended, it deals with hopes and dreams rather than plans and predictions….
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